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Abstract - Using data from 72 countries for the period 1978-2000, we find that financial 
development has larger effects on growth when the financial system is embedded within a 
sound institutional framework. This is particularly true for poor countries, where more 
finance without sound institutions is likely to fail in delivering more growth. For these 
countries, we find that improvements in institutions are likely to deliver much larger direct 
effects on growth than financial development itself. They are also likely to have positive 
indirect effects through the financial system, particularly when the latter is already providing 
large amounts of credit to the private sector. We also find that financial development is most 
potent in delivering extra growth in middle-income countries. Its effects are particularly large 
when institutional quality is high. Institutional improvements can also deliver more growth in 
these countries, especially when the financial system is well developed. Finally, we find that 
while the effects of financial development in high-income countries are much smaller than in 
middle-income countries, even in these countries financial development has larger effects on 
growth when institutional quality is high. 
 
 




















1 Corresponding author: Prof. Panicos Demetriades, Department of Economics University of Leicester, 
University Road, Leicester, LE1 7RH, UK. E-mail: p.demetriades@le.ac.uk. Tel: + 44 116 2522835. We 
would like to thank Gary Koop and Giovanni Urga for helpful comments. We are grateful to conference 
participants at the 21
st Symposium on Banking & Moneteray Economics, University of Nice, France 10 & 
11 June 2004 for helpful comments.  We are also grateful to participants at the Money, Macro and Finance 
Session on ￿Finance & Growth: Recent Developments￿, held at CASS Business School, London, 14 May 
2004 for valuable suggestions. Demetriades acknowledges financial support from the Nuffield Foundation 
(Grant SGS/0667/G). 
  




It is now widely accepted that factor accumulation (including human capital) and 
technological change alone cannot adequately explain differences in growth performance 
across countries. Institutions and finance are separately emerging as the key fundamental 
determinants of economic growth in recent literature.  
 
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society by which the members of a society 
interact and shape the economic behaviour of agents. They may be treated as ￿social 
technologies￿ in the operation of productive economic activities, which involve patterned 
human interaction rather than physical engineering (Nelson and Sampat, 2001). When the 
rules change frequently or are not respected, when corruption is widespread or when property 
rights are not well defined or enforced, markets will not function well, uncertainty would be 
high, and the allocation of resources would be adversely affected. A number of recent papers 
provide empirical evidence that confirms the importance of institutional quality for economic 
performance
1. Rodrik et al (2002) find that quality of institutions overrides geography and 
integration (international trade) in explaining cross-country income levels. Hall and Jones 
(1999) show that differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially 
explain the variation in output per worker. They find that the differences in capital 
accumulation, productivity and output per worker across countries are driven by differences 
in institutions and government policies. Knack and Keefer (1995) find a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional indicators such as quality of bureaucracy, 
property rights, and political stability and economic growth utilising cross-country data. 
Mauro (1995) demonstrates that the countries that have a higher corruption index tend to 
have persistently lower growth. Rodrik (1997) finds that an index of institutional quality does 
exceptionally well in rank-ordering East Asian countries according to their growth 
performance. Pistor et. al (1998) point out that law and legal systems were important in 
promoting Asian economic growth, even though they have been largely ignored by previous 
literature. 
                                                 
1 Aron (2000) provides an excellent review of a large body of empirical literature that tries to link 
quantitative measures of institutions with economic growth across countries and over time. 
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Financial intermediaries perform an important function in the development process, 
particularly through their role in allocating resources to their most productive uses. The 
increased availability of financial instruments reduces transaction and information costs 
while larger and more efficient financial markets help economic agents hedge, trade, pool 
risk, raising investment and economic growth (Goodhart, 2004). Levine (2003) provides an 
excellent overview of a large body of empirical literature that suggests that financial 
development can robustly explain differences in economic growth across countries. However, 
as Levine acknowledges, establishing that the relationship is causal in cross-country studies 
is not straightforward. Zingales (2003) questions the extent to which cross-country 
relationships of this type can be utilised for policy purposes, especially since there is a bunch 
of variables, all positively correlated with growth, which are also highly correlated among 
themselves. These difficulties have prompted a number of authors to examine the relationship 
using time-series data for individual countries in the hope of a better understanding of the 
causality between finance and growth
2. Within individual countries the evidence on the 
relationship between financial development and growth over time is broadly consistent with 
that obtained from cross-section studies in the sense that it is usually a positive and 
significant one. However, an important difference with cross-country studies is that causality 
is typically found to vary across countries. For example, Demetriades and Hussein (1996), in 
their examination of the time-series relationship between finance and growth in 16 less 
developed countries find that causality frequently runs from growth to finance and not vice-
versa. It is, therefore, not sensible to draw out any policy implications from the positive 
association obtained between finance and growth obtained from cross-country studies that 
would be applicable to every country in the world. More finance may mean more growth in 
some cases but not in others. Knowing where it does and where it doesn￿t is critical for policy 
makers. Understanding why there is such variation across countries is an important next step 
for both policy makers and academics, since this knowledge may hold the key to successful 
financial development.  
 
                                                 
2 This is to some extent because the nature of Granger causality tests requires time-series data but also 
because other conditioning variables which may vary considerably across countries, such as human capital 
will only vary slowly, if at all, within countries. Thus, time-series methods could, in principle, be better 
able to unveil the causal pattern between finance and growth.   4
The variation in causality between finance and growth detected in time-series studies 
suggests that there are important differences in the way in which finance influences economic 
growth across countries. Arestis and Demetriades (1997), for example, suggest that it may 
reflect institutional differences across countries
3. This idea is developed further in 
Demetriades and Andrianova (2004), who argue that varying causal patterns may reflect 
differences in the quality of finance, which are, in turn, determined by the quality of financial 
regulation and the rule of law. For example, an increase in financial deepening, as captured 
by standard indicators of financial development, may not result in increased growth because 
of corruption in the banking system or political interference, which may diverts credit to 
unproductive or even wasteful activities. While this is a plausible conjecture, there is as yet 
no hard empirical evidence to suggest that institutions make a difference to the way in which 
finance affects economic growth. Such evidence is clearly the logical next step in the 
evolution of the literature on finance and growth. 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the interaction between institutional quality and 
financial development ￿ i.e. a financial system embedded in good institutions ￿ has a separate 
positive influence on economic growth, over and above the effect of the levels of financial 
development and institutional quality. Testing this hypothesis within individual countries 
requires, however, data on institutional quality that span many decades, since institutions 
usually change very slowly. Such data are only available for the last twenty years or so, 
which makes time-series analysis not possible. However, we have been able to obtain 
institutional quality indicators for 72 countries for the period 1978-2000. We, therefore, 
utilise both cross-section and panel econometric methods to test our hypothesis. Additionally, 
we also examine whether the estimated relationship varies in accordance to the stage of 
economic development. 
 
                                                 
3 An alternative possibility, which has emerged in recent literature, is that the differences in causality across 
countries may reflect different stages of development. Rioja and Valev (2002) demonstrate that financial 
development is most effective in promoting growth in middle-income economies and has positive, albeit 
smaller effect in high-income economies, and is ineffective in low-income countries. Our approach is to 
some extent consistent with Rioja and Valev, given that institutional quality varies with the stage of 
development. Additionally, our approach provides a plausible explanation why the stage of economic 
development may matter for this relationship. We also go a step further and examine whether, once we 
have accounted for the interaction between financial development and institutions, the relationship 
continues to exhibit additional variation with respect to the stage of economic development.  
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays down the empirical model, 
introduces the econometric methodology and summarises the data. Section 3 presents and 










In order to test the effects of financial development and institutions on economic 
growth, this study adopts the framework introduced by Mankiw et al. (1992), Knight et al. 




β α β α − − =
1
t t t t t L A H K Y  (1) 
 
where Y is real output, K is the stock of physical capital, H is the stock of human capital, L is 
the raw labour, A is a labour-augmenting factor reflecting the level of technology and 
efficiency in the economy and the subscript t indicates time.  
 
It is assumed that α + β < 1, i.e. decreasing returns to all capital. Raw labour and labour-
augmenting technology are assumed to grow according to the following functions: 
t n
t e L L 0 =  (2) 
θ P gt
t e A A
+ = 0  (3) 
where n is the exogenous rate of growth of the labour force, g is the exogenous rate of 
technological progress, P is a vector of financial development, institutions and other factors 
that can affect the level of technology and efficiency in the economy, and θ is a vector of 
coefficients related to these variables. 
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In this model, variable A depends on exogenous technological improvements, the 
degree of openness of the economy and the level of other variables. It is obvious that A in this 
study differs from A used by Mankiw et al. (1992). This modification is more likely to be 
particularly relevant to the empirical cases of the link between financial development, 
institutions and economic growth. The technological improvements are encouraged by 
developments in financial markets, which tend to increase the productive sector￿s efficiency 
or increase the productivity of investment (Pagano, 1993) and also efficient institutions 
(North, 1990, Nelson and Sampat, 2001). 
 
In the steady state output per worker grows at the constant rate g (the exogenous 
component of the growth rate of the efficiency variable A). This outcome can be obtained 
directly from the definition of output per effective worker as follows: 
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Taking logs of both sides of Equation (4) and dropping time subscripts for simplicity, we get:  
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Utilising equation (3) we obtain: 
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Equation (5) determines steady state output per worker or labour productivity, where a vector 
of financial development and institutions policy proxies (P) exist. 
Largely because of data limitations, this study assumes that s
H and gt do not vary over time 
but s
K and n can be assumed to vary over time. This means that ln A0, gt and s
H can be   7
considered as a constant term A0 in Equation (6). Then, the steady-state output per worker or 
labour productivity (y
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where  P consists of financial development and institutions. Rearranging Equation (6), it 
yields an estimation equation for the relationship between financial development, institutions 
and output per worker as follows: 
 
) ln( ln ln ln ln 4 3 2 1 0 δ + + − + + + = g n A K A INS A FD A A RGDPC  (7) 
 
where  RGDPC is real GDP per capita, FD is a financial development indicator, INS is 
institutions,  K is the stock of capital investment or physical capital accumulation, (n + g + δ): 
n is the rate of labour growth, g is the rate of technology growth or technological progress 
and δ is the rate of depreciation. g and δ are assumed to be constant across countries and over 
time and their sum equals 0.05, following Mankiw et al. (1992). A0 is constant term and A1, 
A2 and A3 are the parameters to be estimated. 
 
In order to examine the interaction between financial development and institutions on 
growth, Equation (7) is extended to include a multiplicative interaction term as follows: 
 
         ) ln( ln ) x    ln( ln ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 0 δ β β β β β β + + − + + + + = g n K INS FD INS FD RGDPC        (8) 
 
Equations (7) and (8) provide the basis for the empirical models that are estimated in this 
paper.  
   8




Numerous studies have examined the determinants of economic growth using cross-
section data, including classic papers such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) and 
Mankiw et al. (1992).  In these studies the dependent and independent variables are averaged 
over a fairly long period (usually 20 or move years), which is meant to capture the steady-
state relationship between the variables concerned. Our first set of estimations utilises cross-
sectional estimations, which enables us to gauge our results against literature benchmarks. In 
order to estimate Equations (7) and (8) using cross-section analysis, we use country averages 
for each variable over the full 23-year period (1978 ￿ 2000).  Regional dummies for Latin 
America, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are also included in both equations. Three 
diagnostic tests are carried out in order to check the robustness of cross-sectional analysis, 
namely the Jarque-Bera normality test, White￿s heteroscedasticity test and Ramsey￿s RESET 
functional form test.  
 
 
Panel Data Estimation 
Equations (7) and (8) provide the basis for estimations using panel data techniques. A time 
trend is also included
4 to partially capture the influence of human capital, which due to data 
limitations could not be included in the model specification.  A time trend is a good proxy for 
human capital because the average number of years of schooling for many countries has 
increased steadily over time.  In their analysis of human capital and growth in OECD 
countries, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) find that the time trend variable is only statistically 
significant when human capital is omitted. Thus, the two equations to be estimated are 
modified as follows: 
                                                 
4 The estimation results without the time trend variable are available upon request.    9
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where t is the time trend variable and subscript i refers to the i
th country. The empirical 
analysis of the growth model in Equation (9) and Equation (10) above generally involves a 
system of N x T equations (N countries and T time observations) that can be examined in 
different ways. In this study, the main econometric approaches employed include different 
forms of pooled cross-section time series regressions, which are discussed below. 
 
While cross-sectional estimation methods may, in principle, capture the long-run 
relationship between the variables concerned, they do not take advantage of the time-series 
variation in the data, which could increase the efficiency of estimation. It is, therefore, 
preferable to estimate the growth model using panel data techniques, which, however, require 
careful econometric modelling of dynamic adjustment. The static panel data technique based 
on either pooling or fixed effects, which could be applied to Equation (9) [or (10)], makes no 
attempt to accommodate heterogeneous dynamic adjustment around the long-run equilibrium 
relationship (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al. 1999). Careful modelling of short-run 
dynamics requires a slightly different econometric modelling approach. We, therefore, 
assume that equation (9) [or (10)] holds in the long-run but that the dependent variable may 
deviate from its equilibrium path in the short-run.  
  
The parameters estimates of Equations (9) and (10) are obtained using two recently 
developed methods for the statistical analysis of dynamic panel data, namely the mean group 
(MG) and pooled mean group (PMG) estimators proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and 
Pesaran et al. (1999), respectively. These methods are well suited to the analysis of dynamic 
panels that have both large time and cross-section data fields. In addition, both estimations 
have the advantage of being able to accommodate both the long run equilibrium and the 
possibly heterogeneous dynamic adjustment process. So far these methods have been applied 
to studies of money demand, energy demand, economic growth and convergence. 
    Following Pesaran et al. (1999), we base our panel analysis on the unrestricted error 
correction ARDL (p, q) representation:   10
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                   i = 1,2, ￿ N; t = 1,2, ￿ T. 
 
where  it y is a scalar dependent variable,  it x is the k x 1 vector of regressors for group i, 
i µ represent the fixed effects,  i φ is a scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, 
’
i β ￿s 
is the k x 1 vector of coefficients on explanatory variables,  ij λ ￿s are scalar coefficients on 
lagged first-differences of dependent variables, and  ij γ ￿s are k x 1 coefficient vectors on 
first-difference of explanatory variables and their lagged values. We assume that the 
disturbances  it u ￿s in the ARDL model are independently distributed across i and t, with zero 
means and variances 
2
i σ > 0. Further assuming that  i φ < 0 for all i and therefore there exists a 
long-run relationship between  it y and  it x  defined by: 
 
it it i it x y η θ + =
’            i = 1,2, ￿ N; t = 1,2, ￿ T.    (12) 
 
where  i i i φ β θ /
’ ’ − = is the k x 1 vector of the long-run coefficients, and  it η ￿s are stationary 
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where  1 , − t i η is the error correction term given by (12), hence  i φ is the error correction 
coefficient measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.  
 
  Under this general framework, Pesaran et al. (1999) propose the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimator. This estimator allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients and error 
variances to differ freely across groups, but the long-run coefficients are constrained to be the 
same; that is,  θ θ = i  for all i. The group-specific short-run coefficients and the common   11
long-run coefficients are computed by the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. These 
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On the other hand, the mean group (MG) estimates proposed by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) allows for heterogeneity of all the parameters and gives the following estimates of 
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where  ij ij i i γ λ β φ ￿   and   ￿ , ￿ , ￿ are the OLS estimates obtained individually from Equation (11). In 
other words, the mean group (MG) approach consists of estimating separate regressions for 
each country and computing averages of the country-specific coefficients (e.g. Evans, 1997; 
Lee et al., 1997). This estimator is likely to be inefficient in small country samples, where 
any country outlier could severely influence the averages of the country coefficients. 
 
The MG estimator provides consistent estimates of the mean of the long-run 
coefficients, though these will be inefficient if slope homogeneity holds. Under long-run 
slope homogeneity, the pooled estimators are consistent and efficient. The hypothesis of 
homogeneity of the long-run policy parameters cannot be assumed a priori and is tested 
empirically in all specifications. The presence of heterogeneity in the means of the 
coefficients is examined by a Hausman-type test (Hausman, 1978) applied to the difference 
between the MG and the PMG.  Under the null hypothesis the difference in the estimated   12






The data set consists of a panel of observations for 72 countries
5 for the period 1978 ￿ 
2000. The sample countries are grouped into three groups: high, middle and low-income 
based on the World Bank classification
6. Annual data on real GDP per capita, real gross 
capital formation, total labour force, and three alternative financial development indicators 
(liquid liabilities, private sector credit and domestic credit provided by the banking sector, all 
expressed as ratios to GDP) are collected from World Development Indicators (World Bank 
CD-ROM 2002). All these data are converted to US dollars based on 1995 constant prices. 
 
The data set on institutional quality indicators employed in this study was assembled 
by the IRIS Center of the University of Maryland from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) ￿ a monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). Following Knack and 
Keefer (1995), five PRS indicators are used to measure the overall institutional environment, 
namely: (i) Corruption, which reflects the likelihood that officials will demand illegal 
payment or use their position or power to their own advantage; (ii) Rule of Law, which 
reveals the degree to which citizens are willing to accept established institutions to make and 
implement laws and to adjudicate dispute. It can also be interpreted as a measure of ￿rule 
obedience￿ (Clague, 1993) or government credibility; (iii) Bureaucratic Quality, which 
represents autonomy from political pressure, strength, and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services, as well as the existence of an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training of bureaucrats; (iv) Government 
Repudiation of Contracts, which describes the risk of a modification in a contract taking due 
to change in government priorities; and (v) Risk of  Expropriation, which reflects the risk that 
the rules of the game may be abruptly changed. The above first three variables are scaled 
from 0 to 6, whereas the last two variables are scaled from 0 to 10. Higher values imply 
                                                 
5 The list of countries is presented in Appendix I. 
 
6 The World Bank classifies economies as low-income if the GDP per capita is less than US$755; middle-
income if the GDP per capita is between US$755 until US$9265 and high-income economies if the GDP 
per capita is more than US$9265.   13
better institutional quality and vice versa. The institutions indicator is obtained by summing 
the above five indicators
7. 
 
According to Knack and Keefer (1995), these measures reflect security of property 
and contractual rights, and convey additional information about the institutional environment 
that is not captured by other institutional proxies, such as the Gastil political and civil 
liberties indexes. Numerous studies have employed this data set in the empirical analysis, 
among others, Knack and Keefer (1995), Easterly and Levine (1996), Hall and Jones (1999), 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the whole 
sample and grouped by high-income, middle-income and low-income countries. As shown in 
this table, the high-income countries have the highest level of real GDP per capita, financial 
development and institutional quality compared to the middle-income and low-income 
countries. This implies that higher income is associated with more developed financial 
markets and greater institutional quality. These differences prompt us to examine whether 
finance and institutions have different channels for influencing economic performance at 
various levels of development. Table 2 reports the correlation results and this table shows 
that all three financial development indicators exhibit a positive relationship with real GDP 
per capita for all three sub-samples. The correlation between institutions and real GDP per 
capita is positive for high-income and middle-income countries, whereas the correlation is 
negative for the case of low-income countries. 
 
Figures 1 ￿ 4 present the scatter plots between real GDP per capita against financial 
development indicators and institutions and real GDP per capita from individual observations 
across the 72 countries and over the past two decades. As shown in these figures, there is a 
                                                 
7 The scale of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law was first converted to 0 to 10 (multiplying 
them by 5/3) to make them comparable to the other indicators. For robustness checks, we also used 
different weights for each indicator to construct the aggregate index. The estimates are similar and are 
available on request.   14
positive relationship between real GDP per capita and financial development indicators and 
institutions. The figures also indicate that there is no outlier in the scatter plots.  
 
 
III. Estimation Results 
 
 
We first estimate equations (7) and (8) on the full sample of countries using the OLS 
cross-country estimator
8. The results are reported in Table 3, where Models 1-6 are estimates 
of Equation (7), utilising alternative proxies for financial development. Similarly, Models 7-
12 are estimates of Equation (8), which includes the interaction term between financial 
development and institutions.  
 
To start with, it is important to note that the signs of the estimated coefficients on 
physical capital and labour growth are consistent with theory. It is also worth noting that the 
Jarque-Bera statistic suggests that the residuals of the regressions are normally distributed in 
all twelve models. The White test indicates that the residuals are homoskedastic and 
independent of the regressors, in all twelve models. The Ramsey RESET test results also 
demonstrate that there is no functional form error, again, in all models. Thus, the results of 
the diagnostic tests suggest that the models are relatively well specified. In addition, the 
adjusted R-squared suggests that these models explain about 72 ￿ 83 percent of the variation 
in real GDP per capita.  
 
In Models 1 - 3, all three financial development indicators, as well as the institutions 
variable are positive and statistically significant, as expected. When the regional dummies are 
included, as shown in Models 4 - 6, the institutions variable remains highly significant. 
                                                 
8 The equations were also estimated using 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), to check for possible endogeneity 
of the financial development and/or the institutional quality indicators. The instruments utilised were as 
follows: (i) financial development: legal origins and initial income; (ii) institutional quality: mortality rates 
and initial income; mortality rates were sourced from Acemoglou et al (2002); legal origins from the World 
Bank Group homepage. The 2SLS estimations, which required a slightly different sample period because 
the instruments were only available for the 1985-2000 sample period, enabled us to carry out 3 sets of 
Hausman exogeneity tests. The latter could not reject the hypotheses that: (i) the financial development 
indicators are exogenous; (ii) the institutional quality variables are exogenous; (iii) both the financial 
development and the institutional quality variables are exogenous; for any of the six models (i.e. in total we 
carried out 18 Hausman exogeneity tests). The results are reported in an Appendix (not intended for 
publication). 
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However, of the three financial development indicators only the private sector credit remains 
statistically significant at the conventional level. In Models 7 - 9, the newly included 
interaction term is highly significant, while the significance of the institutions variable is 
reduced to the 10% level. All three financial development indicators remain significant at 
conventional levels except for domestic credit. In Models 10 - 12 where the regional 
dummies are also included, the interaction term and financial development remain highly 
significant, and the coefficients of the interaction term are larger than those of the financial 
development indicators. However, the institutions variable is not significant. These findings 
seem to indicate that both the quantity and the quality of finance matter for economic growth, 
while institutions matter only in so far as they can improve the quality of finance.  
 
Table 4 reports estimates of Equation (9) that utilise three alternative panel data 
estimators: mean group (MG), which imposes no restrictions; pooled mean group (PMG), 
which imposes common long-run effects and static fixed effect models. This table presents 
estimates of the long-run coefficients, the adjustment coefficient, log-likelihood (LR) and 
joint Hausman test statistics
9. The comparison between MG and PMG is based on the 
Hausman test. The lag order is first chosen in each country on the unrestricted model with 
lagged one for the independent variable
10. Because the time span of the panel data is only 23 
years (1978 ￿ 2000), the MG estimator suffers from too few degrees of freedom. The 
Hausman test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis which indicates that the data do not 
reject the restriction of common long-run coefficients. Hence, the MG estimator is not as 
informative as the PMG estimator and we therefore focus on the PMG results. These results 
reveal that the signs of the long-run coefficients remain similar to those obtained by OLS and 
are consistent with theory. The coefficients of physical capital, financial development and 
institutional quality are positive and statistically significant. The static fixed effect estimator 
also demonstrates that there are significant financial development and institutional effects. 
 
Table 5 reports the three alternative panel data estimators of Equation (10) when the 
interaction term is included in the growth model. The Hausman test indicates that the data do 
not reject the restriction of common long-run coefficients, therefore, only the PMG estimator 
                                                 
9 These tests are carried out by using the GAUSS program written by Shin, Y (Department of Economics, 
University of Edinburgh). 
10 The lag structure is (1,0,0,0,0,0) and the order of variables is as follows: dependent variable, K, (n+g+δ), 
financial development, INS and Time Trend.   16
results are discussed. The results reveal that both financial development and institutional 
quality are statistically significant determinants of long-run growth. In addition, we find an 
economically large and statistically significant effect of the interaction term on real GDP per 
capita, which is similar to that obtained with the cross-section OLS regression. However, an 
important difference now is that the institutional quality variable remains significant at the 
5% level or lower in all 3 Models. This suggests that the marginal effects of both finance and 
institutions on growth are higher than has been suggested by earlier literature. Financial 
development has both direct and indirect effects on growth, which broadly speaking reflects 
the effects of financial deepening (size effects) and the influence of institutions (quality 
effects). Similarly, institutional development has both direct and indirect effects on growth, 
with the latter depending on the size of the financial system. In other words, institutional 
development has a greater payoff in terms of growth when the financial system is more 
developed.  
 
We now turn to examine the extent to which the above findings vary with the stage of 
economic development, by re-estimating the models utilising panels of high-income, middle-
income and low-income countries. The results are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively. 
Only the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation results are reported since the Hausman test 
indicates that the null hypothesis of no difference between the MG and PMG estimators 
cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 6 presents the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation results for high-income 
countries. Both the financial development indicators and institutional quality retain their 
positive sign, but they are no longer statistically significant in all models. Two of the 
financial development indicators, namely liquid liabilities and private sector credit, remain 
statistically significant, while domestic credit is no longer significant. Institutional quality is 
no longer statistically significant in any of the six models at the 5% level ￿ it is, however, 
significant at the 10% level in the first three models. The interaction term, however, performs 
better. It is statistically significant at conventional levels in two out of three models and 
significant at the 10% level in the third. The coefficients on the financial development 
indicators in models 4 - 6 in Table 6 are much lower than those in the corresponding models 
in Table 5. The interaction terms in Table 6, however, are slightly higher than in the 
corresponding models in Table 5. These findings seem to suggest that even within high   17
income countries financial development, as measured by liquid liabilities or private credit, 
has positive, albeit smaller direct effects on growth, than in the entire sample. Its indirect 
effects, which depend on the quality of institutions, are, however, if anything, somewhat 
larger than in the entire sample. Given that institutional quality is higher in high-income 
countries, financial development may overall still have large positive effects on economic 
growth. The same cannot be said for institutional quality, the effects of which are now largely 
through the financial system. Thus, while institutional improvements appear to display 
diminishing returns, financial development remains an important engine of growth even for 
developed countries. 
 
The pool-mean group results for middle-income countries are reported in Table 7. 
The direct effects of financial development on economic growth are larger and more 
significant than in the high-income group in all of the corresponding six models. This finding 
is consistent with Rioja and Valev (2004), who also find a much stronger growth-enhancing 
effect of financial development in middle-income countries compared to high-income 
countries. Institutional quality also has a positive and highly significant effect on economic 
growth in all six models. Thus, our findings provide support to the argument that good 
institutions are more important for growth in less developed countries (Rodrik, 1997). In 
addition, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term in Models 4 - 6 is both large and 
highly significant. These findings seem to suggest that both finance and institutional quality 
have large direct and indirect effects on growth. Improving both finance and institutional 
quality in middle-income countries is, therefore, likely to boost economic growth, much more 
than in high-income countries. 
 
Table 8 reports the results for low-income countries. Financial development is found 
to have very small direct effects on growth. The estimated coefficients are not only small but 
they are also statistically insignificant for two of the three indicators. Only the private credit 
indicator is significant but its coefficient is only 0.10 compared to 0.40 for middle-income 
countries and 0.20 for high-income countries. Institutions, however, have a large positive and 
significant direct effect on growth in these countries. The estimated coefficients on 
institutional quality are roughly twice the size those obtained for middle or high-income 
countries. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms are positive and highly 
significant, however, they are almost half the size of the corresponding ones obtained for the   18
middle-income group. Our findings suggest that policy makers in low-income countries 
should primarily be focussing on improving institutional quality, which is likely to have both 
direct and indirect effects on growth. Financial development, especially if it boosts credit to 
the private sector, is also likely to have significant payoffs in terms of growth, but even these 






Our findings suggest that financial development has larger effects on growth when 
the financial system is embedded within a sound institutional framework. We found this to be 
particularly true for poor countries, where more finance may well fail to deliver more growth, 
if institutional quality is low. For poor countries, improvements in institutions are likely to 
deliver much larger direct effects on growth than financial development itself. They are also 
likely to have positive indirect effects, through the financial system, particularly when the 
latter is providing large amounts of credit to the private sector. 
 
Our findings also suggest that financial development is most potent in delivering 
extra growth in middle-income countries. Its effects are particularly large when institutional 
quality is high. Institutional improvements can also deliver more growth, especially when the 
financial system is developed. The effects of financial development in high-income countries 
are smaller than in middle-income countries; however, even in these countries its effects 
appear to be much larger when institutional quality is high. It is also worth noting that 
institutional improvements in these countries are only likely to deliver benefits when the 
financial system is large. 
 
To conclude, it does appear to be the case that the interaction between financial 
development and institutional quality, a variable that has been neglected in previous studies, 
is very important in terms of economic growth at all stages of development.
11 Thus, ￿better 
finance, more growth￿ seems to be a much more widely applicable proposition than ￿more 
finance, more growth￿.  
                                                 
11 One possible interpretation of this variable is ￿quality-adjusted finance￿ ￿ since more of it is tantamount to a better 
functioning financial system.   19
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TABLE 1 ￿ DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 RGDPC  (n+g+δ)  K LIA PRI  DOC  INS 
All Countries (n=72)           
Mean  8.8573 -2.6423  3.0419  3.7492 3.5310 3.9456 3.4318 
Maximum  11.3355  -2.4336  7.5959  5.1575 5.1667 5.5288 3.9005 
Minimum  5.7332 -2.9180  2.2625  1.8976 1.1824 2.0370 2.5680 
Standard Deviation  1.5678 0.1451  0.6111  0.5678 0.8213 0.6550 0.3308 
High Income (n=24)           
Mean  10.5968  -2.7898  3.2372  4.0553 4.1170 4.3231 3.7785 
Maximum  11.3354  -2.4824  7.5958  5.1574 5.1666 5.5287 3.9004 
Minimum  9.1869 -2.9180  2.8770  1.8975 1.9580 2.0369 3.3322 
Standard Deviation  0.5461 0.1211  0.9348  0.6299 0.6575 0.6798 0.1726 
Middle Income (n=24)           
Mean  8.6365 -2.5565  3.0174  3.6919 3.4428 3.8636 3.2928 
Maximum  9.9175 -2.4336  3.4666  4.6754 4.5353 4.7142 3.6438 
Minimum  7.2212 -2.7785  2.6230  3.1173 2.1079 2.9841 2.8605 
Standard Deviation  0.6737 0.0871  0.2248  0.4166 0.6269 0.5446 0.2313 
Low Income (n=24)           
Mean  7.0350 -2.5682  2.8369  3.4506 2.9336 3.5910 3.1825 
Maximum  8.1132 -2.4572  3.4305  4.4594 4.4130 4.5882 3.5369 
Minimum  5.7332 -2.7230  2.2625  2.6548 1.1824 2.6483 2.5680 
Standard Deviation  0.6143 0.0685  0.3233  0.4797 0.7486 0.5232 0.2080 
Note: RGDPC = real GDP per capita; (n+g+δ) = labour growth; K = real gross fixed capital formation/GDP; LIA 
= liquid liabilities/GDP; PRI = private sector credit/GDP; DOC = domestic credit/GDP and INS = institutional 
quality.    23
TABLE 2 - CORRELATIONS  
  RGDPC  (n+g+δ)  K LIA  PRI  DOC  INS 
  All  Countries  (n=72)         
RGDPC  1.0000        
(n+g+δ)  -0.7111  1.0000       
K  0.2446  -0.1036  1.0000      
LIA  0.5272 -0.3612 0.0563 1.0000       
PRI  0.7076 -0.5039 0.1446 0.8300 1.0000     
DOC  0.5634 -0.4083 0.0829 0.8909 0.8209 1.0000   
INS  0.8098 -0.6878 0.1396 0.4658 0.6455 0.5099 1.0000 
  High  Income  (n=24)         
RGDPC  1.0000        
(n+g+δ)  -0.5555  1.0000       
K  -0.2762  0.1297  1.0000      
LIA  0.2008  -0.0095  -0.3433  1.0000     
PRI  0.3729 -0.1574 -0.3388 0.9303 1.0000     
DOC  0.3661 -0.1109  -0.2447 0.9320 0.9737 1.0000   
INS  0.8515 -0.5583  -0.5419 0.2403 0.4055 0.3327 1.0000 
  Middle  Income  (n=24)         
RGDPC  1.0000        
(n+g+δ)  -0.4957  1.0000       
K  0.1898  0.1210  1.0000      
LIA  0.3724 -0.3468 0.5278 1.0000       
PRI  0.5651 -0.5407 0.2279 0.5614 1.0000     
DOC  0.3212 -0.2069 0.4021 0.7990 0.7110 1.0000   
INS  0.5733 -0.2668 0.4770 0.3260 0.5067 0.4088 1.0000 
  Low  Income  (n=24)        
RGDPC  1.0000        
(n+g+δ)  -0.0087  1.0000       
K  0.6693  0.0911  1.0000      
LIA  0.6226 -0.0684 0.7220 1.0000       
PRI  0.6600 0.0890 0.7969 0.8360 1.0000     
DOC  0.6232 -0.1941 0.4342 0.8067 0.5748 1.0000   
INS  -0.0271 0.2381 0.4705 0.1637 0.2875 0.0659 1.0000 
Note: RGDPC = real GDP per worker; (n+g+δ) = labour growth; K = real gross fixed capital formation/GDP; LIA 
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TABLE 3 ￿ RESULTS OF OLS ESTIMATION 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita  
(72 Cross-Country, 1978 ￿ 2000) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 



































































































































- -  0.21 
(1.80)* 
- -  0.35 
(2.17)**
 








- -  0.33 
(2.54)** 
- -  0.48 
(2.52)**
 





- -  0.42 
(2.41)**
 
- -  0.28 
(1.36) 
- -  0.40 
(1.88)*
 
- -  0.30 
(2.05)** 
LIA x INS 
 
- - - - - -  0.45 
(2.82)***
 
- -  0.58 
(2.48)** 
- - 
PRI x INS 
 
- - - - - - -  0.57 
(2.29)**
 
- -  0.83 
(1.33)** 
- 
DOC x INS 
 
- - - - - - - -  0.43 
(2.42)**
 
- -  0.55 
(2.23)** 







































2  0.73 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.82 0.81 
 
0.72 0.74 0.72 
 
















































































Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for Jarque-Bera normality, White heteroscedasticity and Ramsey RESET tests, which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.   25
TABLE 4 ￿ ALTERNATIVE PANEL DATA ESTIMATIONS FOR ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita (72 countries, 1978 ￿ 2000) 





















































Log-likelihood  3042.57 2626.03  1056.33 
H Test for long-run homogeneity  8.34 (0.08)
   




















































Log-likelihood  3004.29 2544.16  991.59 
H Test for long-run homogeneity  8.32 (0.08)
   


















     (5.14)*** 
































Log-likelihood  2631.07 3058.72  994.28 
H Test for long-run homogeneity  3.36 (0.50)
   
Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except 
for Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. ***, ** 
 and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. N x T = 1656.  
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TABLE 5 ￿ ALTERNATIVE PANEL DATA ESTIMATIONS FOR ARDL 
(with Interaction term between Financial Development  and Institutions) 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita (72 countries, 1978 ￿ 2000) 

























































Log-likelihood  3141.33 2631.92  1075.78 
H Test for long-run Homogeneity  4.11 (0.53)
   

























































Log-likelihood  3169.64 2631.39  1050.96 
H Test for long-run Homogeneity  5.82 (0.32)
   


















    (4.16)*** 






































Log-likelihood  3166.85 2648.85  996.59 
H Test for long-run Homogeneity  3.44 (0.63)
   
Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for 
Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. ***
 and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
N x T = 1656.   27
TABLE 6 ￿ POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATIONS OF HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita  
(24 countries, 1978 ￿ 2000) 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 

















































































- -  0.14 
(1.51)
 
- -  0.11 
(1.45)
 
LIA x INS 
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DOC x INS 
 


















































Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for 
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TABLE 7 ￿ POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATIONS OF MIDDLE- 
INCOME COUNTRIES 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita  
(24 countries, 1978 ￿ 2000) 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 

















































































- -  0.27 
(3.53)***
 
- -  0.36 
(1.88)*
 
LIA x INS 
 




PRI x INS 
 




DOC x INS 
 


















































Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for 
Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by ***, ** 
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TABLE 8 ￿ POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATIONS OF LOW- 
INCOME COUNTRIES 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita 
(24 countries, 1978 ￿ 2000) 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 















































































- -  0.08 
(0.98)
 
- -  0.13 
(1.38)
 
LIA x INS 
 




PRI x INS 
 




DOC x INS 
 

















































Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for 
Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by ***, ** 










































































































































Figure 2: The Relationship between Real GDP Per Capita and Private Sector Credit 
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APPENDIX I 
List of Countries Used in the Estimation Categorised the World Bank 
 
High Income    Middle-Income    Low-Income   
Australia  AUS  Argentina  ARG  Algeria  DZA 
Austria  AUT  Bolivia  BOL  Bangladesh  BGD 
Belgium  BEL  Brazil  BRA  Cameroon  CMR 
Canada  CAN  Chile  CHL  Egypt  EGY 
Denmark  DNK  Colombia  COL  Gambia  GMB 
Finland  FIN  Costa Rica  CRI  Ghana  CHA 
France  FRA  Cyprus  CYP  Haiti  HAI 
Germany  GER  Dominican Republic  DOM       Honduras  HND 
Greece  GRC  Ecuador  ECU  India  IND 
Iceland  ICE  El Salvador  ESL  Indonesia  IDN 
Ireland  IRE  Guatemala  GTM  Kenya  KEN 
Israel  ISL  Iran  IRN  Malawi  MWI 
Italy  ITA  Jamaica  JAM  Niger  NIG 
Japan  JPN  Korea  KOR  Pakistan  PAK 
Netherlands  NEL  Malaysia  MYS  Philippines  PHL 
New Zealand  NZL  Mexico  MEX  Senegal  SEN 
Norway  NOR  Nicaragua  NIC  Sierra Leone  SIL 
Portugal  POR  Panama  PAN  Sri Lanka  LKA 
Singapore  SIN  Papua New Guinea  PNG  Tanzania  TAN 
Spain  ESP  Paraguay  PRY  Thailand  THA 
Sweden  SWE  Peru  PER  Togo  TOG 
Switzerland  CHE  South Africa  ZAF  Tunisia  TUN 
United Kingdom  GBE  Syria  SYR  Zimbabwe  ZWE 
United States  USA  Uruguay  URY  Zambia  ZMB 
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APPENDIX II (Not intended for publication) 
 
Table AI: OLS ESTIMATION   
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita  
(Sample Period: 1985 ￿ 2000) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 


































































































- -  0.29 
(2.59)***
 
- -  0.23 
(2.05)**
 
LIA x INS 
 




PRI x INS 
 




DOC x INS 
 




















































N   68 68 68 68 68 68 
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for Jarque-Bera, Ramsey RESET and Breusch-Pagan tests, which 
are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by ***, ** 
 and * respectively. 
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Table AII: ENDOGENEITY TEST RESULTS 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
  (without interaction term)  (with interaction term) 
Endogenous 
Variable 
Financial Development   Financial Development 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Legal Origins, Initial Income   Legal Origins, Initial Income  


















Mortality Rates, Initial Income  Mortality Rates, Initial Income 
















Financial Development and Institutions  Financial Development and Institutions 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Legal Origins, Mortality Rates and Initial 
Income  
Legal Origins, Mortality Rates and Initial 
Income  












         
Notes: The null and alternative hypotheses of Hausman test are: H0: Regressors are exogenous versus HA: they are 
endogenous. This test is based on an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom. The mortality 
rates data are from Acemoglu et al. (2001), whereas the legal origins data are from La Porta et. al. (1997) and the 
World Bank Group homepage:  
http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/SnapshotReports/EconomyCharacteristics.aspx . 
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Table AIII: 2SLS ESTIMATION   
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita  
(Sample Period: 1985 ￿ 2000) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 


































































































- -  0.32 
(1.76)*
 
- -  0.22 
(1.72)*
 
LIA x INS 
 




PRI x INS 
 




DOC x INS 
 


















N  68 68 68 68 68 68 
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for Sargan tests, which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% denoted by ***, ** 
 and * respectively. 
 